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Open Access and the Essential
Facilities Doctrine: Promoting Competition
and Innovation
MarissaA. Piropatot

I. THE CHALLENGE OF CONVERGENCE AND THE ESSENTIAL

FACILITIES DOCTRINE

Convergence is the buzzword in the communications industry. Although synonymous with technological innovation, convergence generally describes the integration of several media into
one system, delivering voice, entertainment programming, and
high-speed data on one multi-function terminal.1 Stock multiples

soar as new and old providers tout their service as convergent.
Leaders in the telephone, internet, cable, and wireless industries
are investing billions of dollars to develop converged services. 2
The former monopolist, AT&T, and industry heavyweights
America Online, Bell Atlantic, and MCI Worldcom have bought
companies and developed infrastructure to enter the fray.3
The basic intuition that convergence requires innovation is
accurate. Only a decade ago, the phone company delivered plain
telephone service, the cable company offered cable, and internet
service providers were little more than upstarts working out of
the family garage. Now, firms such as AT&T serve many communications needs via broadband,4 including cable TV, internet ac-

t

B.A. 1997, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Chicago.
1 See Carol Ingley, No Technology Is an Island, 23 Satellite Commun 28 (Nov 30,
1999).
2 See Direct Testimony of James 0. Robbins, President of Cox Communications,
Broadbandand Consumer Access to the Internet, Fed News Serv (Apr 13, 1999).
3 See Andrew Kupfer, Mike Armstrong's AT&T: Will the Pieces Come Together?, 139
Fortune 82, 82 (Apr 26, 1999) (noting that AT&T has spent over $70 billion on acquisitions
and infrastructure development).
4 The FCC defines broadband as the capacity to support "inboth provider-toconsumer (downstream) and the consumer-to-provider (upstream) directions, a speed (in
technical terms, "bandwidth") in excess of 200 kilobits per second (kbps) in the last mile."
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
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cess, and both local and long-distance phone service. Broadband,
however, is merely the first step in the evolution of the communications marketplace. Technological innovation is transforming
the services consumers can obtain over one line.
Convergence strains traditional legal analysis. Because convergence permits one provider to offer many services across many
media, courts and regulators find it increasingly difficult to
neatly classify a bundle of services as cable, telephone, or data, or
to determine whether to apply telecommunications or cable
regulation to these services. 5 Moreover, convergence promotes
consolidation and discourages the entry of smaller providers, thus
threatening competition.6 Courts must determine whether traditional antitrust principles adequately address the dynamic communications industry. The essential facilities doctrine particularly requires re-examination.
Under the essential facilities doctrine, a company that controls a facility that is "essential" for competition must provide its
competitors with reasonable access to that facility.7 A popular
articulation of the doctrine, the bottleneck theory, states that
courts may require a monopolist to provide open access to its
competitors, lest its control of an essential facility allow it to extend its monopoly power from "one stage of production to another,
and from one market into another."8 For example, a computer
company cannot use its dominant position in the operating system industry to gain market power in the internet browser industry? Similarly, a company may not use its control over cable access to consumer homes to secure a dominant position in the telecommunications and internet services market."
This Comment argues that courts are beginning to consider
open access" requirements inspired by the essential facilities docDeployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 14 FCC Rec
2398, 2406 (1999).
5 Compare AT&T Co v Portland,216 F3d 871 (9th Cir 2000) (defining cable-delivered
internet access as a telecommunications service), with MediaOne Group, Inc v County of
Henrico, 97 F Supp 2d 712 (E D Va 2000) (defining cable-delivered internet services as
cable services).
6 See notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
7 See Section II.
8 MCI Communications Corp v AT&T Co, 708 F2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir 1983).
9 United States v Microsoft Corp, 87 F Supp 2d 30, 34-37 (D DC 2000).
10 AT&T v City of Portland,43 F Supp 1146, 1150 (D Or 1999) (holding that a cable
modem could be an essential facility).
11 As the Federal Communications Commission itself recognizes, there is not one
accepted definition of "open access" in the advanced telecommunications sector. In a Notice of Inquiry regarding Cable Modem Services, the FCC noted that "[miost open access
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trine for new and convergent services such as broadband via cable. The infrastructure investment, settlement agreements,
mergers and acquisitions, and bargaining occurring in the
shadow of the law are more important than the essential facilities
doctrine itself. Indeed, because the doctrine, like many legal
remedies, is a last resort for carriers seeking access to facilities, it
may not provide relief quickly enough. In a time-sensitive industry such as telecommunications, competition requires general
guidelines to curb anticompetitive behavior and to lower transaction costs.12
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC," "Commission") should articulate bright-line rules for open access claims
inspired by the essential facilities doctrine. Although such guidelines would not be binding, they would provide courts with an
interpretative roadmap. Under these new guidelines, open access
would be necessary and a facility would therefore be "essential"
only if competitors need the facility to compete effectively. If the
company seeking access can reasonably innovate around the facility, install its own networks, or gain access to alternative facilities that provide a satisfactory substitute, the guidelines should
discourage judicial intervention.13 Because an expansive reading
of the essential facilities doctrine could stifle innovation, courts
should mandate open access only when markets forces alone cannot adequately foster competition.14 In effect, the Commission, not
the courts, should be setting forth the general social, economic,
and technological parameters for open access disputes.
Part I of this Comment considers recent dramatic changes in
the technology and market structure of the communications industry, identifying how these developments may pose insurmountable barriers to entry for smaller communications providers. Part II reviews the legal backdrop for mandating access under the essential facilities doctrine, examining judicial application of the doctrine to traditional and high-tech communications
proposals entail two broad requirements, providing unaffiliated ISPs with the right to: (i)
purchase transmission capability; and (ii) access the customer directly from the incumbent
cable operator." See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet, GN Docket No
00-185 at 12 (2000).
12 Guidelines can lower transaction costs by applying open access requirements on
incumbents' facilities. This would end much squabbling on the state and federal level
about the duty to provide access in the first instance.
13 See Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy In Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches, <http:/lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/newcomm.htm> (visited Nov 1,
1999).
14 Id.
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companies. Part III argues that federal regulators should promulgate guidelines in order to create a precise framework for openaccess disputes involving an alleged essential facility. This Comment suggests three factors that the guidelines should emphasize
in order to ensure competition in the converging digital and
communications marketplace: (1) the location of, (2) possible alternatives to, and (3) market success of the facility at issue. In
addition to creating a rudimentary framework for adjudicating
essential facilities disputes, regulators should develop a licensing
scheme that rewards innovation by providing a financial premium for infrastructure investment.

II. TELECOMMUNICATIONS: DYNAMISM, CONVERGENCE
AND REGULATION

Regulation and judicial oversight have been permanent fixtures of the telecommunications landscape. Under the traditional
view held by regulators and courts, the telephone system was a
natural monopoly,1 5 making the telecommunications network an
essential facility.1" The rise of new communications technologies
and the concomitant deregulation of the long-distance and local
phone markets have enhanced competition in the communications industry, thereby casting doubt upon the longstanding perception of the telecommunications market as one of natural monopoly. 7 The challenge for courts and regulators is to adapt past
regulation and precedent to the digital communications marketplace.
A. The Ancien Regime
In the past decade, technological and regulatory developments
have transformed the telecommunications industry. Until that
transformation, long-distance, local, cable, and cellular providers
offered discrete services over distinct networks governed by different laws." Before a federal district court ordered divestiture in
15 A natural monopoly occurs when the costs associated with producing a good or
service decline as the demand for the good or service increases. In such circumstances,
economies of scale dictate the efficiency of a single supplier of the good or service. Thomas
G. Krattenmaker, Telecommunications Law and Policy 345 (Carolina Academic 2d ed
1998).
16 See MCI CommunicationsCorp v AT&T Co, 708 F2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir 1983).
17 See Richard A. Posner, The Effects of Deregulation on Competition: The Experience
of the United States, 23 Fordham Intl L J S7, S12-S13 (2000).
18 'See Victoria A. Ramundo, The Convergence of Telecommunications Technology and
Providers: The Evolving State Role in Telecommunications Regulation, 6 Alb L J Sci &
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1982,"9 AT&T consisted of three distinct units: (1) local service
companies; (2) domestic and international long-distance service
providers; and (3) equipment manufacturers. After divestiture,
the district court organized the local companies into seven Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"). ° The divestiture
forbade the RBOCs from offering in-region long-distance services,
but granted the RBOCs individual monopolies over the sale of
local services.2'
Two interrelated factors transformed the telecommunications
landscape. First, the government's regional division of the local
telephone market and the deregulation of the long-distance industry22 constituted crucial first steps toward a competitive marketplace.23 Second, technological innovations expanded the range
of communications offerings. For instance, MCI developed a microwave-based service soon after the Bell divestiture.24 These two
developments proved synergistic: the rise of competition in the
long-distance market created the necessary incentives for competitors to invest in technological innovation.25
Congress responded to the evolving communications market
with the 1996 Telecommunications Act (the "Act").26 Congress
intended the Act to foster competition and lower consumer prices
by deregulating the telecommunications market. 27 By promoting
competition and de-emphasizing government intervention, ConTech 35, 40 (1996) ("Telephone, cable, computer, broadcasting and radio services providers
were entirely separate.").
19 United States v AT&T Co, 552 F Supp 131, 226-34 (D DC 1982) (Modification of
Final Judgment) (detailing settlement that AT&T entered into with the Department of
Justice by which AT&T agreed to divest itself of the RBOCs).
20 John T. Soma, David A. Forkner, and Brian P. Jumps, The Essential Facilities
Doctrine in the Deregulated Telecommunications Industry, 13 Berkeley Tech L J 565, 570
(1998).
21 See id. The court expressed two reasons for this limitation on the Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs"): (1) the BOCs could charge monopoly rents for local services in order
to subsidize their provision of long-distance services, and (2) they impose upon competitors
unreasonable terms of access to the local telecommunications network. United States v
AT&T Co, 552 F Supp at 161-62.
22 See Soma, 13 Berkeley Tech L J at 570 (cited in note 20).
23 See Ramundo, 6 Alb L J Sci & Tech at 40-45 (cited in note 18) (maintaining that
the Bell system divestiture and resulting competition in the long-distance market were
first steps toward a competitive telecommunications environment).
24 See id at 41 (noting that MCI developed a microwave-based offering as one of the
first alternative technologies to wire line service).
25 Id.
26 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified at 7 USC §§ 251 et seq (Supp 1998).
27 Statement of William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission on Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, <http://www.fcc.gov/
SpeechesfKennard/Statements/stwek8l7.html> (visited Apr 30, 2000).
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gress hoped to create a national policy framework that would
support the development of new communications services."
The Act imposed open access requirements on the former Bell
monopolies, requiring the RBOCs to permit their competitors to
resell local services or to connect to RBOC networks.2 9 As the
RBOCs often possessed the only wire link to most consumers'
homes, the opening up of the local market was crucial to enabling
other providers to offer integrated long-distance, local, and digital
services. Despite its focus on the emerging digital communications marketplace in the Act, Congress deferred settlement of its
policy towards advanced service providers who offer broadband,
satellite, or other multi-media services. In fact, the Act followed
the traditional regulatory framework: imposing different regulations on local, long-distance, cable, and cellular providers."
B. The Technological Transformation in Telecommunications
As telecommunications carriers rapidly develop new technologies and deploy new service offerings, telephone markets are no
longer easily identifiable as discrete service segments." Through
IP telephony,32 providers can route voice calls on internet-based
networks.33 Broadband technology, like IP telephony, will enable

28
29

See Soma, Forkner and Jumps, 13 Berkeley Tech L J at 573 (cited in note 20).
Section 251 of the Act imposed interconnection, unbundling, and resale require-

ments on the Bell monopolies and local exchange carriers ("LECs") who have access to
end-users' homes. 47 USC §§ 251 et seq. Because the Bell monopolies control the copper
wire running into most consumers' homes, the main rationale behind these mandates is
that there are very few cost-effective alternatives for would-be local telephone companies.
Moreover, this advantage was a product of the LECs' former state-granted monopoly. See
generally Douglas C. Melcher, State Sovereign Immunity and Judicial Review of Interconnection Agreements under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 8 Commun Law Conspectus 61, 61 (Winter 2000) ("In formulating the 1996 Act's common carrier provisions, Congress recognized the significant competitive advantages of incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") and sought to reduce these advantages by imposing substantive obligations on all ILECs. One of the most important of these obligations is the duty of mandatory interconnection which the 1996 Act established by adding section 251 to the Communications Act.").
30 See Ramundo, 6 Alb L J Sci & Tech at 54 (cited in note 18) (arguing that the regulatory structure has not changed despite innovations).
31 Id (arguing that convergence "blur[s] [] lines between historically discrete services
and providers"). See also Statement of FCC Chairman Kennard on Section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act (cited in note 27); A New Federal Communications Commission
for the 21st Century, <http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/fcc21.html> (visited Oct 31, 2000).
32 New Federal Communications Commission, <http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/fcc2l.
html> (cited in note 31).
33 In 1999, Qwest Communications and Cisco Systems announced their intention to
build a comprehensive internet-based national communications network. This alliance
was part of Qwest's business goal of moving customers from traditional telephone and
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providers to offer voice, cable, video, and internet seamlessly to
end-users through a single line. 34 Although broadband technology
is still in its infancy, providers are employing different technologies to deliver broadband service, including digital subscriber line
("DSL"), cable modems, utility fiber to the home,35 and satellite.
No one technology has assumed a position of market dominance,
and few companies are offering broadband services. 6
The latest technological developments also suggest a growing
convergence between the communications and computer industries. Microsoft has developed partnerships with telecommunications providers in anticipation of combined telecommunications
and computing applications. 7 For example, Microsoft and Sprint
jointly developed a platform that delivers voice and data
services . Other technology firms are eager to sell the next generation of communications services. The CEO of America Online,
Steve Case, stated in a 1999 earnings announcement that the
company "want[s] to embrace every broadband technology." 39 Intel acquired a standards-based computer telephony software developer for merged voice and data networks." The convergence of
telecommunications and data networks illustrates the growth of
computer-based telecommunications networks and the consequent reliance of carriers upon computer-based applications to
control the transmission and receipt of voice and data.
The proposed merger of Time Warner and America Online is
a product of the convergence of the computer and communica-

data networks to a digital IP infrastructure. See Qwest, Cisco in Pact to Build InternetBased Network, Dow Jones Bus News (June 17, 1999).
34 FCC Cable Chief Lathen Calls for Marketplace Solutions in Era of Convergence,
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/NewsReleases/1999/nrcb9Ol3.html> (visited Apr 10,
2000).
35 DSL, or digital subscriber line, increases the speed of copper lines by sending different traffic (voice and data) over different networks. Utility fiber to home is fiber that is
routed into consumers' homes through their utility connections. Cable modems are a type
of communications hardware that offers end-users high-speed internet access. These technologies enable consumers to receive high-speed internet access or to run multimedia
applications.
36 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability,
14 FCC Rec at 2404-05 (cited in note 4).
37 See Paul Krill, Microsoft Eyes Convergence of Telecom, Computing, InfoWorld Daily
News (June 8, 1999), 1999 WL 10504247 (stating that Microsoft has partnered with Sprint
and with Cisco to develop merged communications and computer applications).
38 See id.
39 Richard Siklos, et al, The Net-Phone-TV-Cable Monster, 32 Bus Week 30, 31 (May
10, 1999).
40 See With $780 Million Dialogic Buy, Intel Expands Into Growing Converged Network Market, 31 Software Industry Rep 3 (June 7, 1999), 1999 WL 9494351.
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tions sectors.4 The merged company, worth $300 billion, would
comprise the world's largest internet dial-up network and the
nation's second-biggest cable system.42 Consumer groups, concerned with the ramifications of such a colossal merger for consumer welfare, petitioned the FCC to block the merger in order to
avert an "emerging AT&T-AOL duopoly" in broadband multimedia services.43 Underlying concerns about the merger is cable's
success in the emerging broadband market.4 4 One of the major
cable broadband providers, Excite@Home ("@Home"), has already
signed up three times more broadband customers than the whole
DSL industry.4 5 Although AOL has promised to provide open access to its networks,46 lawmakers and competitors have been
skeptical that market forces alone could adequately promote
competition.47 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has even
contemplated blocking the merger if both companies do not consent to open access conditions.4 8 To some extent, the AOL/Time
Warner merger reflects the growing consensus that, given the
current market conditions, only a few carriers will be able to endure in the twenty-first-century telecommunications industry.
C. The Economics of the New Technology
It is very costly to deploy broadband and other advanced
services. In 1999 alone, the cable industry invested $10 billion in
network upgrades to support the delivery of broadband services.49
The risks associated with these capital-intensive investments are
high. Not only are providers unsure which technology consumers
41 See generally Gerald Levin, Steve Case Holds News Conference on AOL-Time Warner Merger,2000 WL 13802.
42 See id; see also William Holstein, et al, You,':c Got a Deal! Upstart AOL's Snapping
up Time Warner Heraldsa New Era, 128 US News & World Rep 34, 34 (Jan 24, 2000).
43 FCC Gets Complaints About AOL's Deal to Buy Time Warner, Wall St J B20 (Apr
26, 2000).
44 Karen Rodriguez, Cable Access Could be Pricey if AT&T Doesn't End Monopoly, 17
Bus J (Mar 3, 2000), 2000 WL 16038486 ("[Wlith a two-year head start and lower costs,
cable systems could use closed internet access to fundamentally change the competitive
dynamics of the internet and other communications..
45 Id.

46 See Gerald Levin, Case Holds News Conference, 2000 WL at 13802 (cited in note
41).
47 See David Hatch, Case, Levin Pitch Access Proviso, 19 Electronic Media 2, 2 (Mar 6,
2000), 2000 WL 8175779.
48 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Holding Out for Open Access to Cable; FloridaLocalities
Pose Latest Problem for AOL, Time Warner by Refusing to Convey Franchises,Wash Post
E01 (Sept 27, 2000).
49 See Robbins, Broadband and Consumer Access, Fed News Serv (cited in note 2)
(noting that the cable industry spent $10 billion to build broadband infrastructure).

369]

ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE

377

will ultimately embrace, but carriers also confront a changing
regulatory regime.5" The fast pace of technological change and an
uncertain regulatory environment threaten the utility of infrastructure investment.
High-profile mergers and acquisitions reflect the high-cost
structure associated with the modern telecommunications marketplace. AT&T has spent more than $70 billion (or 120 percent
of its total assets) to buy a cable company, a local phone company,
and a global data network.51 MCI WorldCom attempted to acquire
Sprint for approximately $129 billion in order to provide an innovative broadband offering on the combined company's nationwide
Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service ("MMDS").5 2 Micro-

soft and Intel have also made strategic acquisitions to facilitate a
smoother entry into the telecommunications marketplace.53
Given the trend towards industry-wide consolidation, the
barriers to entry for smaller providers are high. Newer entrants
lack the financial and human capital necessary to develop and
deploy broadband technology. While there is competition among
different technologies, only a handful of smaller providers have
managed to offer some type of bundled broadband service.54 The
incumbent cable and local exchange carriers ("LECs") own far
better networks than do upstart providers. LECs' historic monopoly over the local market has enabled them to charge high rates
for basic service, giving them the capital and business record necessary to finance infrastructure investment today.55 Moreover,
the incumbents are well-staffed and have greater brand-name

50 See id (arguing that the mere suggestion of government regulation has a chilling
effect).
51 See Kupfer, 139 Fortune at 82, 86 (cited in note 3) (noting that AT&T acquired
cable company TCI and the local phone company, Teleport Communications Group). See
also Julie Radler Cohen, Europe Kept on Rocking M&A Boat: At End of Last Year, as at

Outset, Europe Told the Hot M&A Story, Mergers & Acquisitions Rep (Jan 3, 2000), 2000
WL 8336867 (describing the forthcoming $61 billion AT&T/Media One merger).
52 MMDS, or Multichannel Multipoint Distribution System, is a wireless cable service
that transmits many television or multimedia signals to consumers. David Barboza, New
Alliance Will Promote Wireless Access to Internet, NY Times C2 (Oct 26, 1999).
53 Intel has purchased a developer of computer-based communications platforms.

Microsoft has invested in cable companies. Krill, InfoWorld Daily News, 1999 WL
10504247 (cited in note 37).
54

Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability,

14 FCC Rec at 2404-05 (cited in note 4).
55 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1999 FCC Lexis 5663, *103-04 (discussing how incumbents enjoy economies of scale and lower costs).
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recognition." The FCC has acknowledged that "entry against
telephone and cable companies is very difficult."57
Several forces will continue to foreclose smaller carriers from
the communications marketplace. The development of technology
and infrastructure is vital to winning market share, but very few,
if any, smaller providers can commit large sums of capital to anything but customer acquisition costs. Many small providers may
not seek to compete on a large scale, and carriers typically must
support substantial capital expenditures through aggressive
growth strategies." Thus, the market will be heavily weighted
against new entrants, making an oligopolistic system probable.
Transaction costs are also high; negotiations between carriers
require sophisticated statutory and regulatory analysis, leaving
carriers with only tentative legal solutions and high lawyer's
bills.
The market entry of several competitive carriers, however,
would promote consumer welfare by depressing prices. 9 To be
competitive, the local market needs more than two or three competitors. A handful of carriers will probably not lead to lower
prices or a greater degree of innovation." Although there are
some limits to the number of carriers that each local calling area
can support, the market is robust and growing. 1 The local market's sustained growth since AT&T's divestiture suggests that the

56 Michael K. Powell, Local Competition ...
CLECs In The Midst Of An Explosion,
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/spmkp819.html> (visited May 1, 2000) ("CLECs are
often relative newcomers to the telecommunications scene, and they are competing
against well-known, entrenched competitors with tremendous capital reserves and most of
the market's customers. Accordingly, CLECs consistently face a difficult battle to attract
customers. It will take superior customer service to move revenue and customers into your
"assets" column ... And, it will just take time. Time to establish brand recognition, customer loyalty, and acceptance of CLECs' technologically advanced services and facilities.").
57 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1999 FCC Lexis 5663 at *103-04 (arguing that the advanced services industry is too immature to be controlled by one or two carriers) (cited in
note 55).
58 See id at *108 (stating that smaller carriers must initially establish a brand name
and create a customer base).
59 See Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 Yale L J 417, 431 (1999)
(arguing that more carrier choice improves consumer welfare).
60 See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century
Discipline Addresses 21st Century Problems, <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/
hitch.htm> (visited Feb 29, 2000).
61 See Trends in Telephone Service, FCC Common Carrier Reports 1, 50 (2000), available online at <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/
IAD/trendl0O.pdf> (visited Sept 30, 2000).
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market can support more carriers than just the RBOCs, the cable
companies, and AT&T.6"
1. The uncertain regulatory response.
The FCC, however, has not clearly established whether, and
in what manner, it intends to regulate advanced services. In February 1999, the FCC released the Section 706 Report on the Deployment of Advanced Services in order to address the development of new communications technology." The Commission concluded that the advanced services market was still embryonic and
that intervention was unnecessary because providers were
quickly introducing advanced telecommunications offerings.' The
Report suggested that the Commission's primary goal was to
avoid aggressive regulation of the advanced services sector of the
telecommunications industry."
Six months after releasing the Section 706 Report and announcing its hands-off policy, the FCC adopted The Advanced
Services Third Report and Order, which established guidelines to
promote competition for advanced services.66 The Order required
incumbent local exchange carriers to open the high-frequency
portion of the local loop67 to competitive carriers in the data and
internet industries.68 The FCC stated that by requiring open access it hoped "to ensure that as many companies as possible will
be able to deploy new technologies on a faster, more cost-effective
basis and [that the Order] should accelerate the ability of residential and small business customers to access competitive
broadband services from their choice of providers."69 In other
words, the FCC recognized that because of the high costs of network construction, many smaller carriers were not on an equal
62 See id (table depicting the substantial growth of local telecommunications services
since 1993).
63 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability,
14 FCC Rec at 2406 (cited in note 4).
64

Id.

Deborah Lathen, Letter to the Editor, NY Times, <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
misc/statements/lathen082599.html> (visited Nov 22, 1999).
66 Federal Communications Commission to Accelerate the Availability of Advanced
Telecommunications Services for Residential and Small Business Customers (Nov 18,
1999), <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/NewsReleases/1999/nrcc9092.html>
(visited Nov 20, 1999).
67 A local loop is the copper wire that connects the local carrier to a consumer's home.
68 Federal Communications Commission to Accelerate the Availability of Advanced
Telecommunications Services, <http'//www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/News-Releases/
1999/nrcc9O92.html> (cited in note 66).
65

69

See id.
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footing with the incumbents, and thus remedial regulation was
necessary to promote competition.7 °
The FCC's ambivalence about whether to regulate advanced
telecommunications services reflects the complexities inherent in
regulating an evolving industry. Open markets promote innovation, yet high technological innovation may exclude some smaller
companies that lack know-how, capital, and intellectual property
rights. In an industry where the pace of technological change
across media is staggering, when and how regulators should intervene is a pressing issue. The essential facilities doctrine provides one avenue for regulators endeavoring to promote competition and innovation in the advanced services market.7'
III. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE

Although there has been a long line of essential facilities
cases, neither the judiciary, the FCC, nor the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has successfully articulated what precisely constitutes an "essential facility." Existing precedent is incoherent and
inconclusive, providing courts with little more than patchwork
guidance. Under one common articulation of the doctrine, a facility is essential if the competitor seeking access cannot reasonably
duplicate the facility.72 According to another popular account of
the doctrine, the bottleneck theory, a facility is essential if it enables a monopolist to control a downstream market or a different
level of production.73 In some cases, a facility need not be unique
or vital to invoke the doctrine, but merely important for competition in the relevant market.74 In other instances, the focus of the
courts may be on how a denial of access will affect either competitors' costs or consumer welfare.75
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted the
essential facilities doctrine by that name, the Court first applied
the paradigm for the doctrine in, United States v Terminal RailSee id.
See Soma, Forkner and Jumps, 13 Berkeley Tech L J at 606 (cited in note 20).
72 See Twin Laboratories,Inc v Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F2d 566, 568 (2d Cir
1990) (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that "duplication of the facility would
be economically infeasible") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
73 See MCI CommunicationsCorp v AT&T Co, 708 F2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir 1983).
74 See Hecht vPro-Football,Inc, 570 F2d 982, 992-93 (DC Cir 1977).
75 See Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen HighlandsSkiing Corp, 472 US 585, 606-07 (1985).
70
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road Association of St Louis.76 In Terminal Railroad, an association of railroads controlled all means of railroad access through
St. Louis, including all bridges, terminal facilities and railroad
tracks.77 Although the evidence in the record did not establish
conclusively whether the association pursued exclusionary tactics, the Supreme Court observed that the association charged
monopoly rates that harmed non-member carriers." In addition
to its concern that the Association was extracting unduly high
rents, the Court articulated two reasons for requiring access:
(1) it was virtually impossible for nonparticipating carriers to develop their own facilities; (2) and it was necessary for carriers
desiring access to the railways surrounding the city to be able to
pass through the St. Louis interchange.79 The Court entered a
decree that mandated that the Association provide access to its
competitors at reasonable terms. °
The Supreme Court implicitly invoked the essential facilities
doctrine in Otter Tail Power Co v United States,8 when it required an electricity monopolist to give competitors access to its
wholesale electricity. 2 The Court's principal concern was that
competitors lacked an alternative power supply. Because the defendant was a natural monopolist already subject to regulation,
the precedential impact of the decision may be quite limited."
The Otter Tail dissent recognized that the doctrine imposed access requirements without creating a protocol for enforcement.84
Rather, sporadic action by the courts would "work mischief" by
encroaching on the power of the regulatory agency.85
More recently, in AT&T Co v Iowa Utilities Board,86 the Supreme Court indirectly referred to the essential facilities doctrine.
In Iowa Utilities Board, the Court considered whether Congress
under the Act authorized the FCC to set rates in the local market
and whether local incumbents must offer every network element
for individual sale rather than on an integrated platform." The
76

United States v Terminal RailroadAssociation of St Louis, 224 US 383, 410 (1912).

77 See id at 391.
78

See id at 399-400.

79 See id at 391-92.
80

See Terminal Railroad, 224 US at 411-13.

81 Otter Tail Power Co v United States, 410 US 366 (1973).
82
83
84
85
86
87

See id at 382.
See id.
See Otter Tail, 410 US at 391-92 (Stewart concurring in part dissenting in part).
See id at 392 n 8.
AT&T Co v Iowa Utilities Board, 525 US 366 (1999).
See id at 376-77.
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Court held that while the FCC did have the authority to mandate
prices, it had to establish some limiting standards on local open
access requirements under § 251 of the Act. 88 That section sets
forth the "necessary and impairs" requirement, asking whether
the access is necessary for the competitor and whether it would
impair the ability of the incumbent to provide service to its customers.8 9
In the Iowa Utilities Board majority opinion, Justice Scalia
argued that the necessary and impairs standard is similar to the
essential facilities doctrine. However, Scalia noted that the Court
need not determine whether the "1996 Act requires the FCC to
apply that standard; it may be that some other standard would
provide an equivalent or better criterion for the limitation upon
network-element availability that the statute has in mind."9 Justice Breyer, concurring in part, noted that while the Court had
never officially adopted the doctrine, § 251 basically requires an
essential facilities analysis.9' Although neither Justice Scalia nor
Justice Breyer adopted the doctrine outright, the essential facilities doctrine was nonetheless the touchstone of their analyses in
determining when and how the FCC may mandate open access
requirements.9 2
B. Lower Court Jurisprudence
Lower courts have been more forthright in their application of
the doctrine. Decided more than six decades after Terminal Railroad, a D.C. Circuit case, Hecht v Pro-FootballLeague,93 gave rise
to the first judicial use of the term "essential facilities."94 In
Hecht, the plaintiff alleged that public authority managing the
88 See id.

89 47 USC § 251(d)(2) (Supp 1998).
90 See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 US at 388.
91 See id at 428 (Breyer concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("And although the
provision describing which elements must be unbundled does not explicitly refer to the
analogous 'essential facilities' doctrine (an antitrust doctrine that this Court has never
adopted), the Act, in my view, does impose related limits upon the FCC's power to compel
unbundling. In particular, I believe that, given the Act's basic purpose, it requires a convincing explanation of why facilities should be shared (or 'unbundled') where a new entrant could compete effectively without the facility, or where practical alternatives to that
facility are available.").
92 See Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 436 (cited in note 59) (noting that the
Supreme Court considered the "relevance of the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust
law as a limiting principle for the FCC's current interpretation of the 'necessary' and
'impair' standards").
93 Hecht v Pro-FootballLeague, 570 F2d 982, 992-93 (DC Cir 1977).
94 See id at 991.
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only substantial football stadium in the greater Washington D.C.
area controlled an essential facility. 5 After a verdict for the defendants, the D.C. Circuit held that the lower court erred in failing to give a jury instruction that a public stadium could be an
essential facility for the operation of a football team in Washington.9 6 The Hecht court focused on two issues: whether the plaintiff
could reasonably invest in an alternative stadium and whether
the stadium was absolutely necessary for professional football
teams.9 7 The court noted that it was unlikely that the defendant
had a legitimate business justification for its refusal to deal.9"
In MCI Communications Corporationv AT&T,99 the court set
forth the seminal articulation of the essential facilities doctrine
as applied to the communications industry."' The principal question before the MCI court was whether AT&T had to open its monopoly in the long-distance and local telephone markets to competition. 10 ' The MCI court required four necessary elements in
order to establish an essential facilities claim: (1) the monopolist
must control an essential facility; (2) the competitor must be unable, given a reasonable expenditure of resources, to duplicate
that facility; (3) the monopolist must deny a competitor access to
that facility; and (4) the monopolist must be reasonably able to
provide access to that facility.1 2 Although the court rejected
MCI's claim that AT&T's long-distance network was an essential
facility, it ruled in favor of MCI's attempt to win access to local
facilities.0 3 By separating local from long-distance markets, the
district court in MCI attempted to establish a general rule that
the law should prohibit regulated monopolies from operating in
deregulated industries.0 4

95 See id at 992.
96

See id at 993.

97 See Hecht, 570 F2d at 992-93.
98

Id.

99 MCI Communications Corporationv AT&T, 708 F2d 1081 (7th Cir 1983).
100 See id at 1131-33.
1Ol See id at 1132-33.
102 See id at 1132-33.
103 MCI, 708 F2d at 1132-33.
104 Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine:Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity,and Other Network Industries, 51 Stan L Rev 1249, 1265 (1999).
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IV. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE AND ADVANCED
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS

The MCI decision, rendered in 1983, set the standard for judicial intervention in the communications industry under the essential facilities doctrine. 5 The MCI case was unique because
the essential facility at issue was a state-created monopoly." 6 In
contrast, the telecommunications advanced services market is
only loosely regulated." 7 Market dominance in advanced services
may be more the product of superior research and sound business
planning than the artificial creation of regulation. Although currently many of the primary providers of advanced telecommunications services are former cable, long-distance, and local phone
incumbents, these companies deployed broadband to remain
competitive rather than to buoy monopoly power.
A. Judicial Application of the Doctrine to the Advanced
Telecommunications Market
1. Voice mail and billing services.
Responding to the evolution of the telecommunications market, courts have held that communications services such as voice
mail could be essential facilities.1 8 Plaintiffs demanding access to
communications services may need access not only to a network,
but also to a computer system for billing or voice mail services.
Courts have recognized the importance of new communications technologies and have extended the doctrine to the provision of services. In Sunshine Cellular v Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc,' the court held that a two-way billing services agreement was an essential facility."0 The court observed that the
agreement was necessary for the plaintiff to compete effectively
for cellular customers who wanted the freedom to call outside of

See Soma, Forkner, and Jumps, 13 Berkeley Tech L J at 593-594 (cited in note 20).
Michael K. Powell, Remarks before the Federal Communications Bar Association,
<http://www.ftc.gov/Speeches/Powell/spmkp902.html> (visited Mar 6, 2000).
107 Deborah A. Lathen, BroadbandToday, 1999 FCC Lexis 5099, *86.
108 See generally CTC Communications Corp v Bell Atlantic Corp, 77 F Supp 2d 124,
147-48 (D Me 1998) (finding that voice mail could be an essential facility).
109 Sunshine Cellular v Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc, 810 F Supp 486 (S D NY
1992).
105

106

110 Id at 497.
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their calling areas."' The decision in Sunshine Cellular reflects a
broadening application of the essential facilities doctrine.
Other courts have likewise expanded the traditional scope of
the doctrine to encompass communications-related services. The
district court in CTC Communications v Bell Atlantic11 viewed
voice mail services as an essential facility. Although it was unclear whether Bell Atlantic had a monopoly in voice mail services,
the court found persuasive the fact that CTC's inability to provide
voice mail caused a large volume of its business customers to
switch to other carriers." 3 Considering a similar issue, the federal
district court in American Telnet, Inc v GTE Corp... held that the
plaintiff adequately alleged that the defendant's billing and collection services constituted an essential facility.
Judicial expansion of the essential facilities doctrine to encompass services has vitalized use of the doctrine. As courts hear
the first claims against a new generation of communications providers offering a full complement of integrated services, plaintiffs
are attempting to employ essential facilities arguments to mandate open access. At least one court has been receptive to the doctrine, even though convergence means that consumers have a
variety of options for communications services." 5 In other words,
the high likelihood of market concentration encourages courts to
continue to be receptive to suits brought by competitor carriers." 6
The high cost of building networks and developing technologies
encourages courts to view access to facilities of the market leaders as essential to competition.
Regulators have similarly recognized the doctrine's importance as a legal backdrop for some emerging advanced telecommunications disputes. The FCC's counsel for advanced services,
Jason Oxman, has implied that the essential facilities doctrine
remains relevant in the advanced telecommunications service
market, but should apply only to a technology that is serving as a
bottleneck." 7 He reasoned that the essential facilities doctrine
should limit judicial or administrative intervention to only those
111 See id at 491-92. But see Volmar Distributors,Inc v New York Post Co, Inc, 825 F
Supp 1153, 1160-61 (S D NY 1993).
112 77 F Supp 2d, 124, 147-48 (D Me 1998).
113

Id.

114 American Telnet Inc v GTE Corp, 1999 US Dist Lexis 9380, *2 (N D Tex).

AT&T v City of Portland,43 F Supp 2d 1146 (D Or 1999).
See Kennard, New Federal Communications Commission, <http://www.fcc.gov/
Reports/fcc21.html> (cited in note 31).
117 See Should We Open Access for Cable Networks? FCC Says No, ISP Bus News (Sept
6, 1999), 1999 WL 6610367.
115

116
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cases in which a facility is unequivocally necessary."' Plaintiffs
would have to prove that the provider had a monopoly over a
service or product and that the monopolist blocked free and fair
access to the facility." 9 Such an approach, however, would not
really be a departure from current law, and would also place the
burden on smaller carriers to prove monopoly power in the dynamic communications or software markets-a task that is arguably cumbersome and expensive. In practice, this would also
squarely shift to courts the responsibility to define the relevant
market and to determine market power, creating high administrative costs and little certainty.
2. Cable modem services.
Although the integrated services industry is still developing
and no single technology predominates, courts have nonetheless
applied essential facilities reasoning to this growing market. 2 °
One of the seminal cases, AT&T v City of Portland ("Portland l")," grew out of a cable license transfer proceeding in
which the local franchising authority deemed AT&T's cable modem to be an essential facility.'2 2 The Portland regulators reasoned that cable's higher speed and lower cost would drive out of
business smaller internet service providers ("ISPs").'23 The court
agreed and rejected AT&T's arguments that open access, by requiring AT&T to modify its equipment for ISPs, would impose an
undue burden.'2 4
One year later, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court's ruling on the grounds that federal communications law, rather than local authorities, should regulate
broadband cable services ("PortlandIF).'25 The Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the open access or the essential facilities ques118 See id ("As bypass networks and new technologies change the communications
landscape, the Commission must be ever vigilant to prevent.. . bottlenecks that block free
and fair access to essential facilities.").
119 See id.
120 See generally AT&T v City of Portland,43 F Supp 2d 1146 (D Or 1999); American
Telnet, Inc v GTE Corp, 1999 US Dist Lexis 9380 (N D Tex).
121 43 F Supp 2d 1146 (D Or 1999).
122 See id at 1150 (observing that the local regulatory authorities classified "AT&T's
cable modem platform as an 'essential facility' to protect competition").
123 Id ("Representatives of unaffiliated ISPs told the Commission that the ISPs
couldn't compete with @Home's higher speed, wide availability, and relatively low cost.").
124 See id at 1154 (finding that AT&T could support open access without any undue
burden or hardship).
125 AT&T Co v City of Portland,216 F3d 871 (9th Cir 2000).
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tions, noting that it could not defer to the FCC because the Commission had not yet addressed the open access issue.'26 Rather, it
focused on the legal status of broadband cable services under the
Act. The court found that @Home did not fit into the Communication Act of 1934's 27 definition of cable services because @Home
did not provide "one way transmission of programming. " 128 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that @Home instead provided a telecommunications service because it did more than lease lines and provide content like traditional ISPs, but rather it transmitted
internet services over its own cable facilities. 2 9
As a telecommunications service, the court concluded that cable-delivered internet access was, like DSL, subject to the Act's
"dual duties of non-discrimination and interconnection."'
Invoking principles used by the court below to justify its essential
facility holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that these dual duties
"produce a network architecture that prioritizes consumer choice,
demonstrated by vigorous competition among telecommunications carriers. As applied to the internet, Portland calls it 'open
access,' while AT&T dysphemizes it as 'forced access."""' The
Ninth Circuit further reasoned that the "principles of common
carriage" applied to cable transmission. 112 Although the Ninth
Circuit did not explicitly follow the lower court's holding by calling @Home's cable broadband transmission an essential facility,
the Ninth Circuit's emphasis on common carriage has its roots in
the traditional common law notion of an essential facility. However, the Ninth Circuit declined to go as far as the lower court by
allowing the local Portland authorities to regulate broadband,
126

Id at 876 ("The parties, and numerous amici, forcefully urge us to consider what our

national policy should be concerning open access to the internet. However, that is not our
task ... We note at the outset that the FCC has declined . . . to address the issue before
us. Thus we are not presented with a cases involving potential deference to an administrative agency's statutory construction pursuant to Chevron.").
127 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, amended the
Communications Act of 1934, codified at 47 USC §§ 151 et seq (Supp 1998).
128 Portland11, 216 F3d at 879.
129 Id at 878. In its amicus brief, the FCC, however, declined to define cable-delivered
internet access as a communications service. The Commission noted that to date, the
Commission has not decided whether broadband capability offered over cable facilities is a
"cable service" under the Communications Act, or instead should be classified as "telecommunications" or as an "information service." The answer to this question is far from
clear. The statute itself does not provide a definitive answer. See PortlandII, No 99-35609
(9th Cir 2000), brief for the Federal Communications Commission 19-20, <http://
techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/19990816fcc.htm> (visited Sept 29, 2000).
130 Portland11, 216 F3d at 878.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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holding that FCC has jurisdiction over telecommunications pol133
icy.
Although the Ninth Circuit's ruling does provide some interpretative guidance, the open access debate remains unsettled. A
federal appeals court is considering an open access ordinance
similar to the one considered in PortlandI & 11.13' The FCC has
begun proceedings to consider whether it should mandate open
access for cable-delivered internet services.' Despite numerous
appeals from ISPs for immediate action, the Commission has
thus far declined to mandate any relief before conducting comprehensive proceedings on the open access issue. The Commission
noted that "before we will take any regulatory action on this issue, we must first determine that open access is desirable as a
policy matter and that market forces are insufficient to achieve
this objective."13 6
At the local level, cable franchising authorities in San Francisco, California; Broward County, Florida; and the City of
137
Fairfax, Virginia, have begun to consider requiring open access.
A San Francisco commission recently supported the Portland I
decision, but delayed for three years the implementation of similar open access requirements to enable cable operators to recover
sunk costs.'3 8 In 1999, Broward Country and Fairfax both voted in
favor of requiring the cable incumbents to provide open access to
ISPs. 139 The Colorado legislature is considering a bill that would
140
force cable companies to open their networks to competitors.
The Portland dispute suggests that the essential facilities doctrine will be a popular avenue for companies seeking access to a
new service or product offering.' 4'
Courts have, however, placed some limits on the doctrine.
While access to a cable modem may create a legitimate essential

133

Id at 878-79.

134 See Michael Buettner, Federal Court Hears Appeal in Cable Internet Access Case,

Dow Jones News Serv (Sept 27, 2000).
135 Inquiry ConcerningHigh-Speed Access to the Internet, GN Docket No 00-185 at 12
(cited in note 11).
136 Id.
137 Lathen, BroadbandToday, 1999 FCC Lexis 5099 at *21 (cited in note 107).
138 San Francisco Delays Open Access Vote, Broward County Sued, 2 Warren's Cable
Regulation Monitor 1 (Aug 2, 1999), 1999 WL 6826026.
139 Lathen, BroadbandToday, 1999 FCC Lexis at *21 (cited in note 107).
140 Opening Cable Lines Opens a Pandora'sBox, 51 Denver Bus J 60A, 60A (Mar 3,
2000).
141 See, for example, Mostly Media Inc v US West Communications, 186 F3d 864, 865
(8th Cir 1999) (arguing that video dialtone was an essential facility).
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facilities claim, courts have been less willing to view access to a
customer base as necessary to competition. In a recent case
against AOL, an online advertiser argued that under the essential facilities doctrine, it should have had access to AOL's customer base."' The advertiser's reasoning for mandatory open access was that AOL "controls the essential facility for access to all
persons who obtain access to the Internet through AOL. '4 Although the court accepted that AOL controls an essential facility
for access to AOL subscribers, it noted that there were many reasonable alternatives to AOL.144 The court observed, as an example, that a business needs to make only a small capital investment to become an ISP.' An advertiser, the court reasoned,
could affordably reach an on-line customer base, thereby undermining the plaintiff's essential facilities claim.146
B. The Doctrine in the Information and Computer Markets
1.

Convergence of the telecommunications and
computer industries.

There are many significant similarities between the telecommunications and computer industries. The rapid pace of technological innovation places both industries in a continual state of
growth and change. New or updated products and services
emerge more regularly in telecommunications and data markets
than in traditional industries such as oil and aluminum, undermining existing market power.'47 In contrast to the early antitrust cases, where the alleged monopolist dominated a market for
decades, the computer and telecommunications product lifecycle
is generally quite different.'4 8 For example, IBM dominated many
segments within the computer industry in 1969, but only slightly
142

See America Online, Inc v GreatDeals.Net,49 F Supp 2d 851, 856 (E D Va 1999).

143

Id at 862.

144 Id at 863 (observing that plaintiff admitted that it could access AOL customers

through other means).
145 See id at 863 ("Anyone can acquire the computer equipment necessary to provide
internet access services on a smaller scale with a relatively minor capital investment.").
146 See America Online, 49 F Supp 2d at 863; see also Compuserve Inc v Cyber Promotions, Inc, 962 F Supp 1015, 1025 (S D Ohio 1997) (finding that "Internet users are not a
'captive audience' to any single service provider but can transfer from one service to another").
147 See Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis (cited in note 60) (observing that new generations
of products appear more frequently in high-tech industries than in mature ones).
148 Id (arguing that the major players in traditional industries could expect to dominate a market for generations).
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more than a decade later IBM had lost its market power across
several industry segments.14 9 Similarly, a lower court held in
1984 that Data General had a monopoly over the chip market,
yet, just ten years later, the alleged monopolist had descended
into obscurity. 5 ° Although market leaders presently dominate
sectors of both the telecommunications and the computer industries, new technologies threaten to supplant the leading companies.
The first signs of convergence are apparent in the communications and computers markets, narrowing the analytical divide
between the two industries. Sophisticated computer platforms
will enable communications providers to deliver advanced telecommunications and data services.15 The major computer manufacturers have invested millions of dollars in telecommunications
enterprises in anticipation of inter-industry convergence.'52 On
the consumer level, web-enabled phones running on computer
operating systems are in the beta stages of testing.5 ' As advanced telecommunications services evolve, this convergence is
likely to continue.
2. Network effects: the doctrine's relevance in the
computer industry.
Although the traditional application of the essential facilities
doctrine involved physical structures, some courts hold that information can be an essential facility if it is necessary for competition.5 4 This extension of the doctrine mirrors the shift in the
American economy towards information-based businesses.'55 The
concept of an essential facility takes on a new meaning in infor149 See id (observing that while IBM had monopoly power in many computer markets
in 1969, it faced competition thirteen years later).
150 Digidyne Corp v Data General Corp, 734 F2d 1336, 1341-43 (9th Cir 1984).
151 See $780 Million Dialogic Buy, 31 Software Industry Rep at 3, 1999 WL 9494351
(cited in note 40).
152 See id.
153 See Network Convergence Steals Cebit Limelight, PC Dealer 4 (Mar 24, 1999), 1999
WL 7760059.
154 See, for example, BellSouth Advertising & PublishingCorp v Donnelley Information
Publishing,Inc, 719 F Supp 1551, 1566-67 (S D Fla 1988), revd on other grounds, 999 F2d
1436 (11th Cir 1993) (holding that updated information for telephone listings could be
considered an essential facility); Great Western Directories, Inc v Southwestern Bell Telephone Co, 63 F3d 1378, 1384-88 (5th Cir 1995), partially revd on other grounds, 74 F3d
613 (5th Cir 1996) (discussing lower court finding that directory was an essential facility).
15 See generally Amy Barrett, The 50 Best Performers:What Sets CorporateAmerica's
SuperstarsApart? Lightning Instincts-SeizingNew Opportunitiesand Knowing How to
Leverage Their Strengths, 3674 Bus Wk 124 (Mar 27, 2000).
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mation industries. Increasingly, competitors will seek access not
to a physical structure, but to a technology. In this setting, regulators will have to pursue a complex balancing between intellectual property rights, access terms, consumer needs, and enforcement obstacles.
Despite these complexities, courts have sometimes invoked
the essential facilities doctrine to mandate open access in the
computer industry.'5 6 Scholars often justify essential facilities
arguments in computer markets on the grounds that the doctrine
can respond to network effects."' Network effects usually dictate
a market structure that achieves efficiency with fewer competitors. On the producer end in network industries, the initial cost of
building a network is high while the subsequent cost of maintaining the network is low. Each new customer adds to the carrier's profitability while only marginally adding to its costs.
On the consumer side, the network is more valuable to each
consumer if many customers use the same network. Because both
producers and consumers benefit from standardization of the
network or products associated with the network, one network or
product typically becomes the industry standard. Once a product
or network achieves dominant status, a would-be competitor
must convince many consumers to switch, imposing high transaction costs. Because of this phenomenon, network industries have
substantial barriers to entry that enable the dominant player to
exercise market power.'
To take an oft-cited example, although it may be expensive to
develop an operating system such as Windows, once that system
becomes the standard, programmers will be more likely to write
programs for Windows. Because most programs are for Windows,
consumers will be more likely to purchase Windows products.
In the software industry, software development is a company's principal cost. User acceptance of this software increases
the company's profits while imposing only negligible additional
costs. A competitor may be unwilling to invest in computer program development in the first instance where another program or
protocol has already become the industry standard. A facility can
thus become essential by virtue of the fact that it has already

156 See United States v Realty Multi-List, 1982 WL 1878, *1 (D Ga).

151 See Lawrence White, US Public Policy Toward Network Industries (New York
University Center for Law and Business) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
158 Douglas Melamed, Does Regulation Promote Efficiency in Network Industries?, 23
Harv J L & Pub Pol 147, 148-50 (1999).
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been accepted by users, rendering development and marketing of
competing systems too costly.
However, it is not clear that network industries so uniquely
threaten competition that they require judicial or regulatory imposition of the essential facilities doctrine.' 9 While consumers
can become locked into a product or system, such inelasticity may
be ephemeral in technology markets. For instance, consumers'
migration from cassette tapes to CDs or from VCRs to DVDs evidences the weakness of network effects in the high-tech industry.
The telecommunications and data markets may be different,
however, in that consumers may be less willing to migrate to new
services; an individual consumer wants to keep the same e-mail
address, phone number and familiar software program. Because
of the substantial barriers to entry, network effects may allow
incumbent industry leaders to extract monopoly rents. 6 ° In order
to prevent excessive prices and foster competition, regulatory intervention can promote consumer welfare.
C. Judicial Application of the Doctrine to the Computer and
Software Industry
1. Computer chips.
Although the software industry is still maturing, courts have
applied the essential facilities doctrine to require the industry's
market leaders to open access to their intellectual property. In
IntergraphCorp v Intel Corp,' an Alabama federal district court
found that Intel's Pentium II computer chip was an essential facility.'62 Intel had between 60 and 65 percent of the microprocessor market, leading the district court to find a dangerous probability of monopolization. 6 ' Because of Intel's market power, the
district court found samples of the Intel chips, and information on
advanced technological design, necessary to the plaintiff's survival in the computer industry."
1'9 See id at 147.
160 See id. See also Rodriguez, Cable Access Could be Pricey, 17 Bus J (Mar 3, 2000)
(cited in note 44) (arguing that prices will be $10 to $15 higher if AT&T has a dominant
position in the cable broadband market); Chairman Kennard Says Trend Shows Telecom
Consumers Get More Choices, Lower Prices, 2000 WL 140542 (Feb 8, 2000) (observing that
the prices of telecommunications services have fallen since the divestiture of AT&T).
161 3 F Supp 2d 1255 (N D Ala 1998) ("IntergraphI"), revd 195 F3d 1346 (Fed Cir 1999)
("IntergraphII").
162 See Intergraph I, 3 F Supp 2d at 1277-78.
163 See id.
164 Id.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the lower court's
ruling, noting that Intergraph failed to prove the criteria necessary for a viable essential facilities claim in that Intergraph and
Intel were not competitors. 16 The court observed that "[a]lthough
the viability and scope of the essential facility theory has occasioned much scholarly commentary, no court has taken it beyond
the situation of competition

. . .

in the field itself or in a vertically

related market that is controlled by the facility."'66 Although the
Federal Circuit noted that the firms did compete in one particular
market, the graphics chip market, Integraph's claim still failed
for Intel's lack of monopoly power in that market.'67 The court of
appeals, then, did not reject the essential facilities doctrine, but
rather reasoned that the presence of a competitive relationship
was necessary before the court could intervene.6 8 This suggests
that courts may apply the essential facilities doctrine
cautiously.'69
The impact of the Federal Circuit's ruling on Intel's competitors has been negligible. A few months earlier, Intel had signed a
consent decree with the FTC requiring Intel to give competitors
access to its chips. 7 ° The FTC sought the decree because, like the
Intel trial court, it considered access to Intel's chips essential to a
competitive marketplace. In effect, the FTC recognized that, as
the overwhelming leader in the microprocessor market, Intel
commanded a unique opportunity to affect competition.17 ' Although the consent decree did not explicitly adopt the essential
facilities doctrine, the reasoning of the decree does parallel the
doctrine.'72 Computer chips, then, like telecommunications connections, can be essential facilities. Even though computer chips
are only small pieces of hardware, they are also conduits for information processing. The lack of accurate data about the Intel
165

See Intergraph11, 195 F3d at 1356-58.

166

Id at 1357.
Id at 1360.
Id at 1357.

167
168

Intergraph1!, 195 F3d at 1357.
See In the Matter of Intel Corporation (Agreement Containing Consent Order),
<http:www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/do9288intelagreement.htm> (visited Oct 24, 1999). On
169
170

remand, the district court dismissed the antitrust claims. See David P. Hamilton, Antitrust Suit Against Intel Is Dismissed, Wall St J B8 (Mar 14, 2000).
171

See id.

However, a consent decree that resembles the essential facilities doctrine does not
have the same precedential weight as a decision by a trial court to impose a duty to provide access to competitors. This case is nonetheless illustrative of the potential application
of the doctrine in antitrust.
172
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chip could preclude Intel's competitors from designing software or
central processing units for mainstream markets.
2. Operating systems.
In a separate case, the DOJ characterized Microsoft's operating system ("OS") as an essential facility. A court of appeals
hearing a monopolization claim against the software manufacturer noted that "Microsoft dominates the world market for operating systems software that runs on IBM-compatible
computers."17 3 Because of the prevalence of Microsoft's operating
system, competitors need the ability to integrate their applications with Windows. Although there are alternatives to
Windows,'74 Microsoft's OS is currently in almost every consumer's personal computer.'75 Windows is the only operating system to have achieved widespread market acceptance. The emergence of Windows alternatives may have come late for many
computer equipment manufacturers who view early market entry
as necessary to create brand identity and consumer loyalty. Because Microsoft currently has a monopoly over OS integration,
Microsoft may control an essential facility.
In the latest antitrust decision against Microsoft, United
States v Microsoft7 ("Microsoft I'), Judge Jackson held that
Microsoft violated the Sherman Act by abusing the software powerhouse's monopoly power through anticompetitive practices and
by tying its internet browser to its operating system.'77 Microsoft
III stretched the definitional boundaries of monopoly power, applying the antitrust laws to Microsoft although it operates in a
dynamic industry where market dominance is precarious. 7 '
While not explicitly referring to the essential facilities doctrine,
Judge Jackson emphasized that access to Microsoft's operating
system was essential for the competitiveness of computer manufacturers and developers.179 Judge Jackson observed that
173 United States v Microsoft Corp, 56 F3d 1448, 1451 (DC Cir 1995).
174 Linux, Java, and the web are possible substitutes for Windows. See generally Don

Clark, Heavyweight Bout: Sun Microsystems and Microsoft Slug it Out in a Debate Over
the Future of Computing, Wall St J R38 (Nov 15, 1999).
175 United States v Microsoft, 87 F Supp 2d 30, 36 (D DC 2000).
176 United States v Microsoft ("Microsoft 11"), 87 F Supp 2d 30, 39-42 (D DC 2000).
177 See id.
178 See generally Mike France, Even if Microsoft Crashes, It May Not Get Burned, Bus
Wk Online (Feb 26, 2000), <http:businessweek.com/microsoftlupdates/up90226a.htm>
(visited Apr 25, 2000) (describing the competitive pressures that are eroding Microsof's
market share).
179 See id.
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"[n]either Microsoft nor its OEM customers believe that the latter
have-or will have any time soon-even a single, commercially
viable alternative to Windows."'8 0 The lack of reasonable substitutes, Judge Jackson held, required that he apply the antitrust
laws.'

Microsoft III reflects the popular conception that competition
promotes innovation and consumer welfare.8 2 Competitors heralded Judge Jackson's decision as conditioning a competitive
marketplace.' Under this view, market dominance resonating of
monopoly power, even in the volatile technological sector, depresses innovators' potential return on their labors. 4 As with the
former Bell System's control over telecommunications, Microsoft's
technological and physical control over the software market stymies competition. 5 The Software and Information Industry Association's amicus brief noted that "without enforcement of the
antitrust laws, it is unlikely that innovation in the telecommunications industry would have proceeded so quickly, and in such a
multitude of directions."' By corollary, open access is one solution that will foster innovation. The essential facility doctrine is
one legal instrument to promote such access.
V. PROVIDING A PRECISE FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESSENTIAL
FACILITIES DOCTRINE
Given the significant cost of developing and commercializing
new telecommunications technologies, regulators and courts are
receptive to an open access requirement. 7 However, the in180 Microsoft III, 87 F Supp at 37.

181 See id.
182 See United States v Microsoft, Civil Actions Nos 98-1232, 98-1233 (D DC 2000),
declaration of Paul M. Romer, <http://www-cepr.stanford.edu/news/Microsoft.Romer.
html.> (visited Oct 31, 2000) (arguing that Microsoft's monopoly power chilled competition
and innovation).
183 Lee Gomes, et al, Larger Firms Look for Lesson, Smaller Ones See an Opening, Wall
St J A16 (Apr 4, 2000) (observing that companies in the computer industry "aren't waiting
to declare that brighter days might be just around the corner").
184 See id ("One of the key lessons from the economics of technological change is the
recognition that even in an undistorted market, innovators earn a private return on their
efforts that is less than the social return. As a result, too little innovation takes place. This
problem becomes much worse when a powerful player like Microsoft further depresses the
return to outside innovators.").
185 See United States v Microsoft, Nos CV 98-1232, 98-1233 (D DC 2000), brief for
amicus curiae the Software and Information Industry Association, <http://www.siia.netl
siiaamicus.htm> (visited May 1, 2000).
186

See id.

187

See Pitofsky, Competition Policy (cited in note 13).
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creasing technological and economic complexity of communications services makes determining when access is essential to
competition difficult for both regulators and courts. Currently,
neither the FCC nor the DOJ has provided any meaningful guidance as to what constitutes an essential facility or when open access is necessary for a competitive marketplace. The case law is
equally opaque. Given the lack of manageable standards, the
FCC should promulgate rules to govern open access that are inspired by, but legally distinct from, the Sherman Act essential
facilities doctrine. Such general rules would accomplish the complementary goals of providing courts with clarity and markets
with certainty.
Because the communications industry is so complex and dynamic, a precise inquiry that considers the regional or local market, technology, and competitors when assessing the wisdom of
government intervention will better reflect market dynamics.
Courts and regulators will also need to closely examine the features of the service of question because the convergence of old and
new media may make it unclear whether the service in question
is a telecommunications service. The Telecommunications Act of
1996 and its provisions regarding access to local networks afford
several possible approaches to the regulation of advanced services. For instance, the "necessary and impairs" standard suggests
Congress' underlying policy for access disputes: a new entrant
should gain access only when it is essential to competition and
will not hurt consumers.'88 As with the essential facilities doctrine, however, the necessary and impairs standard is too broad
to provide regulators and courts with concrete guidance. 8 9
A. Regulatory Guidelines for Open Access and Essential
Facilities Disputes
Because the Telecommunications Act does little to resolve the
open access debate, the FCC should use its authority under the
Act to promulgate guidelines addressing when a facility is essential and merits open access treatment.' 90 Although such guidelines would not bind the judiciary, courts would have to defer to

188

Bell Atlantic-DelawareInc v McMahon, 2000 US Dist. Lexis 440, *11 (D Del); see

also notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
189 Consider AT&T Corp v Iowa UtilitiesBoard, 525 US 366, 388-90 (1999) (observing
that the necessary and impair standard is vague).
190 See id.
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the Commission's interpretation of open access under the Act.19 '
At the very least, these guidelines would create a disincentive for
courts to bend the essential facilities doctrine to marginal cases
where antitrust principles have little relevance. Moreover, courts
are relying on case law that reflects old industry paradigms. An
articulation of open access standards by the Commission that
embeds many of the principles of the doctrine could harmonize
essential facilities cases with the advanced telecommunications
marketplace. Finally, guidelines promote predictability and
transparency, enabling carriers to make infrastructure investment and merger decisions with full information. To this end,
three factors should be central to courts' analysis of open access
claims inspired by the essential facilities doctrine: (1) the competitive condition of the relevant market; (2) any alternatives to
the purported essential facility at issue; and (3) the market share
of the facility at issue.'92
1. Geographic specificity.
The guidelines should first articulate standards requiring
adjudicators to evaluate competition with respect to a defined
geographic market. 9 3 Because of economies of scale and demand
variability, the cost of providing telecommunications service varies widely by geographic region.19 Densely populated regions are
the most profitable and hence most likely to attract
competition.'95 Moreover, because of distance constraints, fixed
wireless local services now primarily can accommodate developed
suburban and urban areas. A facility, whether it be a local loop or
a cable connection to end-users, is thus unlikely to be essential in
a major metropolitan area. 9 ' Moreover, if competition has already set prices efficiently, mandating open access will not increase economic welfare and may actually lead only to a wealth
191 See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 US at 377-79 (arguing that § 201(b) of the 1934
Communications Act explicitly gives the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing matters
to which the 1996 Act applies, including the promotion of interstate competition and
ratemaking); see also Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp, 146 L 2d 121, 120 (2000).
192 Id (holding that the FCC should consider whether there are alternative suppliers to
the incumbent BOC before determining whether access is necessary).
193 Consider Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 471 (urging the FCC to interpret the
necessary and impair standard with temporal and geographic specificity) (cited in note

59).
See id at 472-47 (cited in note 59).
195 See generally id at 472 (cited in note 59).
196 See id.
194
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transfer from the incumbent to competitive carrier.'97 In such a
case, consumers would not benefit because they would not receive
improved or lower-priced services.'98 Thus, the first step in an
open access analysis for essential facilities claims is to consider
the particular characteristics of the relevant market.199
An open access analysis requiring geographic specificity does
impose added regulatory costs. The application of a national rule
declaring certain network elements or facilities to be essential
would be less burdensome than a rule requiring a region-byregion analysis. 00 While the conservation of regulatory resources
is a legitimate goal, a nationwide policy for open access does little
to expedite deregulation. A nationalized approach would ultimately force regulators to continue government oversight of open
access until the market at large was ready for deregulation.2 1 In
contrast, a geographic-specific approach permits regulators to
remove access requirements as each market becomes competitive,
speeding the transition to a deregulated market.
2. Plausible substitutes for the facility.
The guidelines' second line of inquiry should consider alternatives to the contested facility. Under many traditional interpretations of the essential facilities doctrine, the construction by
competitive carriers of comparable facilities obviates the need for
court intervention by providing the very foundation for a competitive market.0 2 Although clear, this reading of the doctrine is too
simple in open access disputes. The presence of a single competitor offering a substitute product or service may not be enough to
197 See Alexander C. Larson, William E, Kovacic, and Douglas R. Mudd, Competitive
Access Issues and Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J Contemp L 419, 469-70
(1994).
198 See Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 472 (concluding that open access in already competitive markets does not affect competition) (cited in note 59).
199 See id.
200 Consider In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisionsof the
1996 Telecommunications Act, 1999 FCC Lexis 5663 at *162 (observing that the enforcement of a national list of network elements that LECs must make available to competitive
carriers would necessitate spending significant amounts of regulatory resources) (cited in
note 55).
201 See, for example, Conference: Harvard Electricity Policy Group: Regulatory Decisionmaking Reform, 8 Admin L J Am U 789, 910 (1995) (arguing that regulators in
smaller jurisdictions have more flexibility and are thus better able to respond to changing
circumstances).
202 See Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 504 (arguing that an alternative facility
supplied by a non-incumbent carrier would create the necessary foundation for a competitive market) (cited in note 59).
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ensure robust competition. For instance, the substitute may have
geographic limitations or have a history of customer service or
transmission quality problems.2 "3 In drafting the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress implicitly agreed: under the Act, incumbent LECs must provide cable companies access to their networks in spite of the fact that those cable companies have begun
to offer local services.2 4
Regulators must principally consider not whether a competitor exists, but whether the competitor has viable alternatives to
the incumbent's network. The hardest cases will be those in
which the facility in question is clearly better than the alternatives, but, for reasons such as price, the quality difference will not
be so marked as to eliminate every competitor. 20 5 For example,
although slightly more expensive, 20 6 cable broadband services are
considerably faster than similar services over telephone lines, but
not enough to preclude entirely the existence of competing
ISPs. 2 7 The essential facilities doctrine applies to open access
cases where the competitive handicap is considerable, but not so
severe as to eliminate competition entirely.2 8 Under this rationale, courts should require access to communications services that
have only inferior substitutes. The current case law hints at such
an approach, but fails to adopt it wholesale.2 9

203 As an example, fixed wireless services are not yet dependable because of interference problems.
204 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the

TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 14 FCC Rec at 8694 (cited in note 55).
205 See Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr. and J. Gregory Sidak, Symposium: Essential Facilities,
51 Stan L Rev 1187, 1212 (1999).
206 A typical cable broadband service costs between thirty and sixty dollars a month,
while internet services over telephone wires cost between fifteen and twenty dollars a
month. Prices, however, vary by region, and some ISPs offer their services for free. See
generally Bruce Upbin, Free For All: One Day Any Company With a Brand Name May
Offer Free Internet Access to Cozy Up To Customers. That Bodes Ill for America Online,
2000 Forbes 140 (May 1, 2000).
207 See Carl Weinschenk, Migrating Headaches-Before It Can Upgrade Its Dial-Up
Base to Cable Modems AOL's Got A Lot to Think About, tele.com (Jan 24, 2000):
Analysts agree that migrating existing and prospective AOL dial-up customers will be a highly price-sensitive undertaking. A recent Yankee
Group Study found that 62 percent of U.S. PC owners were either interested or very interested in high-speed service. That number dropped to 40
percent when a $40 million price tag was added and respondents were
asked whether they were interested or very interested in making the
switch within 12 months.
208
209

See Lipsky and Sidak, 51 Stan L Rev at 1212 (cited in note 205).
See AT&T v City of Portland,43 F Supp 2d 1146, 1149-50 (D Or 1999).
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Another way to pose the same question is to consider
whether competitors can duplicate the facility or product and the
type of investment required to produce that facility.2 1 ° When sunk
costs rather than variable costs constitute a substantial part of
the total costs of the facility or product at issue, the competitors
will typically face higher entry and exit barriers. 21' Facilities requiring high sunk costs are more likely to be essential because
competitive carriers will largely find such facilities too costly
given the high level of risk associated with duplicating those investments. In these cases, the guidelines should support open
access.

212

3. The facility's market share.
Lastly, the FCC guidelines should also ask whether the facility at issue has become the market standard or, at least, has
achieved a critical share of the market. If the facility is competitors' sole means of access to the technology or to consumers, then
the facility is necessary for the competitive carrier to succeed in
the relevant market. Because this guideline requires complex factual judgments, a special master could determine whether an alleged monopolist controls access to a technology that has become
a market standard. 213 As in cases of monopolization, the FCC
should articulate some baseline percentage of market penetration
to determine whether a service option has become the market
standard.2 14 If a product or service is not a market standard (or is
unlikely to become a market standard), then the open access
claim is invalid. This approach would be particularly tailored to
the dynamic communications market, where monopoly power is
an unsettled concept. 2" This factor has the added advantage of
See id.
See id.
212 See generally Lipsky and Sidak, 51 Stan L Rev at 1212 (cited in note 205).
213 This requires an independent judgment of what constitutes a market standard.
Something may be the market standard without having an extremely high consumer
penetration rate. For instance, consumers may eventually want to migrate to DSL service
because it is the fastest broadband technology, but because of sunk costs in other service
options, these consumers may delay switching. If "market standard" means more than
mere market dominance but also reflects consumer preference, DSL could be the market
standard.
214 The courts could rely on Judge Hand's Alcoa test in this area for guidance-85
percent of the market is enough market share to warrant intervention while 50 percent is
not enough-for example, 75 percent of all internet consumers use cable. See United
210

211

States v Aluminum Co of America ("Alcoa"), 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945).
215 See Soma, Forkner and Jumps, 13 Berkeley Tech L J at 598-99 (cited in note 20).
See also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 270 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1977)
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placing the burden of defining an essential facility for the purposes of open access disputes squarely on the FCC or on experts
rather than relying solely on the common law.216 In effect, courts
will not be responsible for making specialized, highly technical
judgments in an area where they lack expertise.
The challenge inherent in the above analysis is determining
when a carrier plausibly has market power. In the high-tech telecommunications services industry, competition generally occurs
under the guise of innovation.2 17 The next successful entrant will
probably offer a new service or product. Competition then will
occur among different service offerings and technologies, rather
than being based purely on price. For example, cellular service
has begun to compete with traditional local wire-line service. 8
This requires a reconsideration of what constitutes a competitor in the advanced telecommunications services market. Under
the common-law essential facilities doctrine, courts have imposed
a direct competitor requirement on parties seeking access. In the
converging telecommunications marketplace, this requirement
may stifle many valid claims, because competition is largely composed of competing technologies, instead of competing prices
within a specific market sector or technology. There are few essential facilities cases that consider intermarket rather than intramarket competition.2 19 In its open access guidelines, the Commission should expand the competitor requirement to account for
competition across many media. In effect, market definitions
must reflect technological convergence in the telecommunications
sector.

(noting that the ICC, the agency that formerly regulated the railroad industry, presumed
market dominance "where the railroad's rates are 150 percent of its variable costs on the
route in question").
216 Experts must also decide the relevant market in terms of product. For instance, it
is not clear whether the proper market is "access to the internet" or "high-speed access to
the internet." Such decisions require considered factual determinations best made by the
courts. See Robert H. Lande, Statement of Professor Robert H. Lande on America Online/ Time Warner Merger, 2000 WL 11068894.
217 This observation is consistent with the general conclusions of the Federal Trade
Commission's staff report on competition policy in high-tech and global markets. That
report concludes that competition in particular market segments increasingly focuses on
various dimensions of innovation. Telecommunications is an example of that kind of industry. See Pitofsky, Competition Policy (cited in note 13).
218 Daniel Eisenberg, Dial C For Cheap: Cell-Phone ProvidersAren't CateringJust To
the Elite Anymore, Time Digital 18, 18-19 (Mar 8, 1999) (finding that because cellular
phone prices are dropping, consumers are beginning to substitute their wireless phones
for wireline service).
219 See notes 97-133 and accompanying text.
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B. Industry Dynamism: Potential Regulatory Responses
Technological dynamism in the telecommunications sector
should not altogether preclude antitrust enforcement. The
Chairman of the FTC found that although the telecommunications market will eventually be competitive, serious risks of
exploitation by a near monopolist persist:
Even if "eventually" is only 2 or 3 years away, there remains the concern that consumers will be exploited while
we wait for the future to arrive . . . . Another antitrust
concern... is that it is precisely in a dynamic marketplace
that it becomes particularly important to insure that private arrangements do not impede the ability of new technologies to enter the market.22 °
The prospect of competition in a few years may not be enough to
ensure healthy competition in the present market. Because research and development fuel technology markets, the barriers to
entry are quite high, making it easier for incumbents to charge
costly access prices.
As a practical matter, one of the most significant responsibilities for courts and regulators that deem a network monopoly
an essential facility is the determination of access terms to that
facility. Courts' current interpretations of the doctrine may require the monopolist to grant open access to rivals on reasonable
terms, but the cases provide little guidance as to what constitutes
reasonableness." 1 In theory, courts' reliance on precedent should
establish a functional policy, but in communications disputes the
facts are complicated, the economics are contentious, and courts
have varying levels of technological expertise.2 22
One of the major issues for competitive carriers is the price of
interconnection."
Plaintiffs will predictably dispute access
prices, arguing that exorbitant charges are equivalent to a denial
of access because they effectively prevent price competition and a
220

Pitofsky, CompetitionPolicy, (cited in note 13).

See Otter Tail, 410 US at 373 (holding that a utility had to give access to its competitors when such action is "necessary or appropriate in the public interest").
222 See id at 391-92 (Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
courts lack the qualifications to regulate utilities).
223 See Michael Kerf and Damien Geradin, ControllingMarket Power in Telecommunications:Antitrust vs. Sector-Specific Regulation: An Assessment of the United States, New
Zealand and Australian Experiences, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 919, 956 (1999) ("However, it
seems that the problem here is not that of granting access per se, but that of determining
at'what price access should be granted.").
221
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competitive rate of return.2 2 4 The FCC should use the power Congress granted it under the Act to develop a more precise rate
structure that would apply only to facilities that courts deem essential. This rate structure should respond to two distinct and at
times contradictory goals: (1) rewarding innovation, and (2) creating conditions supportive of new entrants.
1. FCC-defined licensing scheme for advanced services.
To ensure the development of both competition and innovation, the FCC should formulate licensing fees for facilities that
courts classify as essential and thus subject to open access requirements under the guidelines. The access fees should reflect
not only sunk costs, but should also include a premium based on
the degree of risk assumed by the network incumbent in order to
become the market leader.225 In effect, this approach would suggest that regulators follow the same approach as markets. 226 Although creating a market-mimicking formula and, more generally, quantifying risk are tall orders, private and public entities
have successfully met this challenge. For example, returns on
stocks and bonds correlate positively with risk levels. 227 Regulation should similarly compensate carriers for assuming risk.2 25
Monitoring rate terms imposes a smaller administrative burden
on regulators than would more sweeping regulation.22 9
Such an approach would depart from the method of price setting traditionally employed by state utility regulators. The traditional rate schedule calculates the utility's start-up costs, subtracts depreciation, and adds a rate of return sufficient to provide
a reasonable return on investment.23 ° The modern telecommunications equivalent to these formulas is Total-Element LongRange Incremental Cost ("TELRIC"), a formula devised by the
FCC that attempts to approximate what it would actually cost a

226

See Soma, Forkner and Jumps, 13 Berkeley Tech L J at 605 (cited in note 20).
See Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis (cited in note 60).
See Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law at 315-17 (cited in note 215).

227

See id.

224
225

See generally id at 251 (noting that where competition and hence risk are minimal,
regulators presume cost-based regulation of a natural monopoly).
229 See generally Frank P. Darr, Deregulationof Telephone Services in Ohio, 24 Akron
L R 229, 231 (1990) (discussing the advantages of price regulation).
230 See Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc v McMahon, 2000 US Dist Lexis 440, *10 n 3
(D Del) (noting that the traditional pricing formula for utilities is rate-of-return pricing).
228
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competitive firm to generate an unbundled network element." 1
However, neither the traditional utility rate formula nor TELRIC
suits the digital communications market; many dominant providers are no longer government-mandated monopolies and both
formulas need to account for the risk inherent in competitive
markets." 2 Advanced service providers, whether former incumbents or not, should receive a premium that reflects their risk
exposure.
In practice, any licensing proposal, no matter how compensatory, turns advanced service providers into common carriers (like
the RBOCs), a status the FCC has, so far, been unwilling to impose on emerging services.233 However, as converged services become the market standard, regulatory intervention requiring
open access will rest on a sounder basis because the market
structure will be less tentative. The Act mandated the FCC to
regularly conduct hearings on the need for open access in the advanced communications market precisely because the FCC, as the
Commission itself has recognized, should apply regulatory solutions only where market forces alone are not enough to encourage
competition." 4
VI. PROBLEMS WITH THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE AS
APPLIED TO OPEN ACCESS DISPUTES

A. The Impact of the Doctrine on Innovation and Deployment
1.

Effects on intellectual property rights.

In imposing open access requirements on next-generation
service providers, regulators must consider whether such access
See David Gabel and David I. Rosenbaum, Who's Taking Whom: Some Comments
and Evidence on the Constitutionality of TELRIC, 52 Fed Commun L J 239, 243-44
231

(2000).
232 See id at 267 ("TELRIC-based prices are not unreasonable. However, as competition evolves, these returns may change. Nothing prevents review at a later time under
new situations and a reexamination of TELRIC pricing."); Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale
L J at 458-60 (cited in note 59) (arguing that the FCC's rate formula is "analogous to a
rule that would require pharmaceutical companies to sell their successful products to their
generic competitors at incremental cost and would allow the pharmaceutical companies to
recover their R&D and production costs on their successful new drugs, but to recover
nothing on their unsuccessful attempts").
233 See Lathen, Broadband Today, 1999 FCC Lexis 5099, *21 (cited in note 107). However, the PortlandII court's dicta views the Act as imposing common carrier obligations on
cable broadband providers. See notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
234 See Inquiry ConcerningHigh-Speed Access to the Internet, GN Docket No 00-185 at
12 (cited in note 11).
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violates intellectual property rights. The facility essential for the
delivery of advanced communications services will no longer be a
mere wire line, but broadband services delivered via sophisticated software platforms and using fiber optic, satellite, cable, or
wireless technology.2" 5 The ability to seamlessly bundle and deliver a range of communications services to the end-user will be
crucial to maintaining competitive viability. 3 6 For example, a
critical feature of an integrated service offering will most likely
be a proprietary convergent billing system2 7 that enables providers to offer users an interactive service. The incumbent controlling the essential facility may maintain a patent right for the particular platform, enabling the monopolist to deny others the use
of its facility. The essential facilities doctrine as applied under
the open access guidelines would thus conflict with the bundle of
rights attached to the monopolist's patent. The principles of the
essential facilities doctrine underline this tension: the more an
invention is unique and difficult to duplicate, and the greater the
risk originally inherent in adoption, the greater the legal duty to
provide open access."'
Regulators should not grant open access claims where an intellectual property right is at stake, lest such grants undo the
intellectual property regime. However, the FCC's approach to the
local services market suggests that it may be willing to give competitive carriers access to proprietary elements. 9 Unfortunately,
if courts or the FCC use open access requirements to encroach
upon patent rights, they may stifle innovation and infrastructure
investment. Companies may hesitate to invest in research to create new communications technologies if courts could demand that
they provide competitors access to their innovations. 4 ° This
problem is particularly salient for the development of new deliv235 Microsoft is investing in such platforms already. See generally Rebecca Buckman,
Microsoft Buys 60% of Japan'sNo. 2 Cable Firm,Wall St J B5 (Apr 12, 2000).
236 See Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 431 (cited in note 59).
237 A convergent billing system allows providers to place different services onto one
billing system. Providers can give inter-service discounts. For example, a company could
program its billing system to give customers free internet service once their wireless usage
exceeded fifty dollars. Although no billing company has developed a convergent billing
system yet, a few companies such as Savile are close.
238 See Lipsky and Sidak, 51 Stan L Rev at 1219 (cited in note 205) (stating that because unique facilities cannot be duplicated, they are likely to be essential).
239 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1999 FCC Lexis 5663, *59-60 (cited in note 55) (stating
that the FCC will give competitive carriers access to proprietary network elements when
necessary for competition, as further defined by considering the relevant market).
240 See Bell Atlantic-Delaware,Inc v McMahon, 2000 US Dist Lexis 440, *11 (D Del).
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ery methods for faster and more advanced broadband services,
given the exorbitantly high cost of such research.
2. Effects on infrastructure investment.
This logic applies equally to investments in infrastructure. A
company that makes extensive capital outlays to build an advanced digital network with a sophisticated switching interface
does so in order to be the market leader. Companies will not be
willing to make such expenditures if faced with the prospect of
judicially-imposed open access requirements.24 ' Appearing before
the House Judiciary Committee, a representative of AT&T argued that the essential facilities doctrine could substantially discourage infrastructure investment:
Since enactment of the Telecom Act, AT&T has led the
telecommunications and cable industries in investing billions of dollars to upgrade cable facilities to provide internet and local telephone services ... Preserving competi-

tors' incentives to make these investments is not simply
important in its own right. The likelihood of competitors
pursuing risky and high-priced investments is slim if
there are not any first mover benefits.242
Wrongly applied, open access requirements will create a classic
free rider problem.243 If competitive carriers can easily obtain access, companies may take a wait-and-see approach, effectively
avoiding risk-taking altogether.244 Companies adopting such an
approach intend to free ride on the investment and energy of
their competitors. Such an approach neither encourages the rapid
deployment of advanced services nor promotes competition.
241

See Robbins, Broadband and Consumer Access, Fed News Serv (cited in note 2)

("The mere suggestion from government that such risky investments could be subjected to
old-fashioned cost-of-service regulation would have a chilling effect on going-forward investments and would slow the roll-out of these new advanced Internet services.").
242 See House Commerce, Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Committee Hearing on Deployment of Data Services, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (June 24, 1999).
243 See AT&T v Iowa Utilities, 525 US 366, 428-29 (1999) ("[A] sharing requirement
may diminish the original owners incentive to keep up or to improve the property by
depriving the owner of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or labor.").
244 See Michael K. Powell, Remarks By Michael K. Powell, Commissioner Federal
Communications Commission, Before the Federal Communications Bar Association,
<http://www.FCC.gov/speeches/powell/spmk902.html> (visited Mar 6, 2000) (cited in note
106) ("One great fear is that if we ordain cable an essential facility and begin to mandate a
right of access on favorable terms, it may well stifle aggressive attempts to develop competing methods of bypassing the cable plant.").
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B. Positive Consequences of the Doctrine on Innovation
and Deployment
Open access, however, may encourage innovation in some circumstances. If a firm can exclude from the network all except the
largest firms with the most economic and political power, it may
also exclude technologically nimble upstarts.245 These young companies, eager to differentiate themselves from their well-known
competitors, might develop and improve on existing technology
and network arrangements.246 Without open access, many smaller
companies will not get the opportunity 2to47 innovate so as to refine
or actually better the initial technology.
Moreover, a licensing scheme that not only is cost-based, but
also rewards incumbents for risk, does not discourage infrastructure construction. Under such a scheme, carriers will charge access rates that permit them to achieve a reasonable rate of return
on their investments.248 Open access will initially advance the
Telecommunications Act's goal of competition by enabling competitive carriers to determine where and how to build facilities. 49
If building a network makes the new entrant more competitive
than would purchasing services provisioned by a LEC, the new
entrant will naturally
adopt a facilities-based business plan as its
25 0
long-term strategy.
In practice, LECs are deploying advanced services despite the
threat of regulation.251 Although the FCC announced plans to
mandate open access to portions of the incumbents' broadband
facilities, LECs have nonetheless begun to offer broadband services in twenty-two of the top fifty metropolitan service areas.252
Despite the dismal predictions of LECs, open access does not necSee Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis (cited in note 60).
Id.
247 Id.
248 See notes 256 and 257 and accompanying text.
249 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 1999 FCC Lexis 5663, *155-56 (cited in note 55) (finding
that competitive carriers may initially need access to incumbents' network facilities because for the competitors to construct their own network facilities would "materially diminish" the ability of the competitor to compete).
250 See Kerf and Geradin, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 956 (cited in note 223) (arguing that
carriers will build facilities if it is in their economic self-interest to do so).
251 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 1999 FCC Lexis 5663, *155-56 (cited in note 55) ("Notwithstanding the fact that the incumbents have been on notice that they could be required
to unbundle facilities used to provide advanced services, the incumbents have announced
aggressive rollout plans for xDSL service.").
252 See id.
245
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essarily make infrastructure investment less attractive so long as
the carrier making investments may reap reasonable profits from
consumers or through open access. Thus, the LECs' deployment
of broadband in spite of the threat of regulation belies the argument that open access frustrates infrastructure investment.
1. The doctrine and free markets.
Plaintiffs seeking to invoke the essential facilities doctrine
must establish how judicial use of the doctrine would constitute
more efficient regulation than that provided by the market alone.
Indeed, the deregulation of AT&T was a boon for consumers and
competitors. 53 In some senses, the market may in fact be the
most efficient regulator of the communications industry. Free
market principles are particularly compelling in high-technology
markets where the industry is rapidly evolving. However, a
wholesale rejection of regulation does compound the risk of monopolization2 5 4 in the telecommunications industry because it is
based on network standards. Standardization heightens the risk
of market concentration, which harms consumers by allowing
carriers to charge higher prices and offer fewer service options.
Some commentators contend that free-market principles
have already triumphed in the telecommunications industry.2 55 In
this view, the conditions for robust competition are present in the
current communications marketplace, eliminating the need for
regulatory intervention. LECs have invested billions of dollars to
deploy high-bandwidth DSL-capable loops.256 To keep pace, major
long-distance carriers have similarly allotted millions of dollars to
offer broadband access in most major markets.2 57 Satellite ven253

See Posner, 23 Fordham Intl L J at S17 (cited in note 17) ("Deregulation revealed

an enormous heterogeneity of demands for telecommunications services, to which a newly
competitive industry responded with imagination and alacrity. The direction of innovation
changed dramatically, from reducing the cost of existing services to creating new services.").
254 See Lipsky and Sidak, 51 Stan L Rev at 1219 (cited in note 205).
255 See Robbins, Broadband and ConsumerAccess, Fed News Serv (cited in note 2). See
also William E. Kennard, Telecommunications @ the Millennium: The Telecom Act at Four
(Feb 8, 2000), 2000 WL 140542.
256 Vito J. Acanelli, Orphan Bells: AOL-Time Warner Deal Leaves Baby Bell Unjustly
Shunned; Time to Buy?, Barron's 17 (Jan 17, 2000) ("SBC Communications will spend
$6 billion to make DSL available to 80% of its customers over the next three years
...Even more ambitious is Bell Atlantic, which is looking to boost its DSL customer base
to 500,000 this year, up from a recent 50,000. The Baby Bell aims to have DSL access
available to 50% of its residential customers, or 10 million households, by April 1.").
257 See Robbins, Broadbandand ConsumerAccess, Fed News Serv (cited in note 2). See
also Toni Mack, Technology: Cheap Gamble: Sprint Enters the High-Stakes Game to
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tures and fixed wireless systems25 8 are also emerging as potential
contenders in the marketplace for broadband access.25 9 The
Chairman of the FCC characterized the market as almost competitive:
[tihe fact that different companies are using different
technologies to bring broadband to residential consumers
and that each existing broadband technology has advantages and disadvantages as a means of delivery to millions
of customers opens the possibility of intermodal competition, like that between trucks, trains, and planes in transportation.26 °
Under this view, competition among technologies can prevent the
development of monopoly power.
Free markets might also be preferable because they typically
have lower administrative costs. One fundamental failing of any
licensing or regulatory scheme is that regulation is not selfexecuting.26 ' An impartial administrator, regulator, or judge
would need to exercise supervisory control over access to ensure
that ISPs and advanced communications carriers do receive open
access as provided by the guidelines.26 2 In practice, this task will
be enormous, and the Commission might better direct resources
towards universal service or educational programs.
C. Obstacles to a Competitive Marketplace
Although the potential for technology-based competition exists, there are many obstacles that may prevent the development
of a competitive marketplace. From a microeconomic standpoint,
Wireup America for Broadband Services. What, No Megadeals?, 1999 Forbes 128 (July 5,
1999) ("AT&T and the other Titans [sic] are betting hundreds of billions on the broadband
future, hoping to sell fat Internet pipes and video services to millions of ordinary folks.
Sprint wants to do the same-but spend only a few billion.").
258 See, for example, AT&T's Breakthrough Wireless Technology New Alternative for
Local Service, <http://www.att.com/press/0297/970225.pca.html> (visited Apr 29, 2000)
(describing a fixed wireless system that will "connect a consumer's home to an AT&T
digital switching center via a neighborhood antenna mounted on a utility pole or other
structure. A single antenna will serve up to 2,000 homes. The only new equipment required on the customer's house is a transceiver about the size of a pizza box that can be
mounted on the side or back of a house.").
259 See id; see also Scott Wooley, Telecoms Kiss that Duopoly Good-Bye, 2000 Forbes
135 (Feb 21, 2000) (describing major carriers' investments in wireless).
260 The Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Services, 1999 FCC Lexis at 449.
261 See Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis (cited in note 60).
262 Id.
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it may not be efficient for each provider to construct facilities to
connect its network to the homes of end-users. 263 It is costly to
reengineer a cable connection for broadband or to upgrade an access network for DSL.26 4 Because of these construction costs, implicit coordination among firms may streamline costs. A carrier
may delay entry or not enter a market where there is already a
broadband presence. In fact, in the cable industry, cable systems
ordinarily only contract with one internet carrier for cable modem
services.265 Thus a cable modem carrier faces effectively no competition once that carrier obtains a carrying contract from a particular cable system.
The potential for cross-technology competition does not alone
establish that robust competition exists in the advanced telecommunications services market. Typically, the carriers deploying broadband services will be the former telephone and cable
monopolists.2 66 Commentators have argued that a duopoly is
likely in broadband, with the market being largely controlled by
the incumbent RBOCs, cable providers, or AT&T." 7 Because of
their existing infrastructure and brand equity,268 former monopolists will enjoy a first-mover advantage in providing broadband.269
Early market penetration may be crucial because consumers will
become locked in once they buy equipment such as cable boxes to
gain broadband access. If the switching costs are too high to justify changing carriers for a slight rate decrease, then the market
is likely to become more concentrated.
Moreover, incumbents have little incentive to provide access
to their competitors.2 7 ° Most cable companies have not provided
See McMahon, 2000 US Dist Lexis 440 at *6.
See generally House Judiciary Committee Hearing on Internet Bills, 106th Cong,
1st Sess (June 30, 1999) (testimony of Mark C. Rosenblum, Vice President, Law and Chief
Litigation and Federal Regulatory Counsel, AT&T), available at 6/30/99 WL Cong Test (no
page) (stating that phone, cable, wireless, and utility will be investing billions of dollars to
build broadband networks).
265 In the Matter of Applications for the Consent and Transfer of Control of Licenses
and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T,
Transferee, 14 FCC Rec 3160, *96 (1999).
266 See id at *97-*98.
267 See id at *98-*99.
268 Brand equity represents the value that a well-known brand adds to a product or
263
264

service beyond the product's or service's functional worth. In other words, consumers
value certain products highly because they trust the brand. With the brand AT&T, for
example, consumers may be willing to pay more for AT&T's services than that of another

carrier because they associate AT&T's brand with dependable service.
269 See In the Matter of Applications of Tele-communications, Inc. and AT&T, 14 FCC
Rec 3160 at *98 (cited in note 265).
270 Lathen, Broadband Today at 1999 FCC Lexis 5099, *21 (cited in note 107).
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unaffiliated ISPs with access to their networks.2 7 ' Cable operators
could readily thwart competition by electing to construct a closed
proprietary network, making it difficult for unaffiliated ISPs or
competitive carriers to connect to that network.27 2 If cable becomes the primary means of broadband access, the risk that cable
operators would pursue exclusionary practices is great. Smaller
ISPs would be foreclosed from the market, limiting consumer
choice to ISPs or competitive carriers that are affiliated with the
incumbent. The essential facilities doctrine provides regulators
with one legal tool with which to ensure competition and consumer welfare.
CONCLUSION

The communications marketplace is dynamic. Developments
in technology continually transform carriers' products and service
bundles. Although such rapid shifts might suggest that the market is self-correcting, such changes often occur at the margin of
the industry. Even with the deployment of new technologies, incumbents can maintain dominant market positions. A major
challenge for lawmakers is to strike a balance between preventing anticompetitive conduct and creating the incentives to innovate.
The FCC should promulgate open access guidelines inspired
by the essential facilities doctrine to regulate the communications
marketplace. In principle, courts, under the guidelines, should
limit use of open access requirements to those cases where the
facility is necessary for competition. In practice, however, the judiciary may so expansively interpret open access and so broadly
define an essential facility as to incorporate nearly any business
facility. Because of these risks, the FCC must articulate concrete
guidelines for open access in order to encourage a more uniform
and equitable application of the doctrine. As the communications
marketplace continues to evolve and traditional conceptions of
monopoly power become more elusive, courts' and regulators' use
of open access to check market power in the communications sector will promote innovation and enhance consumer welfare.
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Id at 78.

272 Lathen, Broadband Today, 1999 FCC Lexis 5099 at *61 (cited in note 107) (citing
panelists who argued that cable would try to extend its monopoly because a "leopard does
not change it spots").

